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Oxford-trained liberal theorist and practicing teacher, Meira Levinson,
 offers a well-articulated argument for her vision of the ideal liberal
 education in The Demands of Liberal Education. Particularly helpful for
 those of us who struggle to convey the aims of liberal education to our
 children and students, she provides an eloquent explanation as she
 describes her ideal school and the steps necessary for its realization:
The aim of liberal education is to teach children the skills,
 habits, knowledge, and dispositions for them to be
 thoughtful, mature, self-assured individuals who map their
 path in the world with care and confidence, take
 responsibility for their actions, fulfill their duties as citizens,
 question themselves and others when appropriate, listen to
 and learn from others, and ultimately lead their lives with
 dignity, integrity, and self-respect—i.e. to be autonomous in
 the fullest sense of the word (1999, p. 164).
As her words paint a portrait of an educated individual, we can see that it
 is colored by autonomy, a central tenet throughout her work.
Striving to fill the literature gap existing between specialized writings on
 liberalism and the slew of commentary on liberal civic education,
 Levinson sets out to clarify the more general connection between
 contemporary political theory and education policy. She endeavors to
 dispel false intuitions about liberalism adopted by theorists and
 practitioners as they shape education policy so that she can make
 liberalism a more coherent theory with an integrated understanding of
 education as essential to its success. This stated intent made me a bit
 uncomfortable from the outset, for I feared that she may focus too much
 on improving education as it relates to strengthening liberalism, rather
 than giving sufficient attention to improving education itself so that
 liberal goals can be actualized in citizens. Though this doubt lingered
 with me as I read, I began to see that, for Levinson, these two goals
 should not and cannot be separated, for their achievement is
 codependent.
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Her first chapter begins with a methodical defining of liberalism which
 may be of little interest to those already familiar with the political theory,
 but eases newcomers into her argument and acquaints them with its
 position in the history of liberal talk. From the beginning, she explicitly
 states that she will not defend liberalism and its principles, which is an
 acceptable omission given that the topic of her book already assumes
 their recognized importance. Other exclusions in her initial defining of
 liberalism are not as acceptable, however. Although she briefly justifies
 scholars who have influenced her preferred understanding of
 contemporary liberalism from a small list of well-knowns (Rawls,
 Locke, Hobbes, Mill, and the like), she does not bother justifying that list
 as opposed to one of more recent, perhaps lesser-knowns, who further or
 challenge the liberal frameworks uttered by these men. Similarly, she
 tends to simplify liberalism into a political/autonomy-based divide.
 Surely liberalism is more nuanced than these alternatives, such that one
 cannot be judged superior to the other without being influenced by or
 paying respect to third-party liberal voices or critics. Inclusion of these
 others would make her portrayal of liberalism more accurately complex
 and might make the liberalism she favors more convincing.
Nonetheless, she aptly defines the three elements of contemporary liberal
 theory as (a) the fact of pluralism, where there are many conceptions of
 the good life; (b) the legitimation process, whereby free and equal
 citizens consensually adopt governing principles and institutions; and (c)
 substantive liberal institutions, which form a constitutional democracy
 respective of individual liberties and conceptions of the good life. As she
 rightly claims, liberals of varying types struggle to unify these elements.
 Picking on political liberals who are not as supportive of the centrality of
 autonomy as she is, Levinson tries to show that political liberalism
 requires at least a rudimentary level of autonomy in order for unification
 to be achievable by way of justifying liberal freedoms and institutions.
 She challenges Rawls and others from his political camp by arguing
 against their claim that autonomy is just a capacity. Instead, she asserts
 that it is a good that is a necessary and central part of contemporary
 liberal theory. She proposes that liberal freedoms and institutions are
 best grounded in a weakly perfectionist sense of autonomy, which she
 initially defines as the ability to form, evaluate, revise, and realize one’s
 own conception of the good. An alternative to political liberalism,
 Levinson defines a weakly perfectionist state as one that “(1) values
 individual autonomy and provides citizens the means and freedoms to
 exercise it; (2) treats all responsible, self-authenticating individuals as
 equal citizens; and therefore (3) does not discriminate against non-
autonomous citizens in protecting their rights or fulfilling its obligation
 toward them” (p. 22). Her disagreement with political liberalism,
 however, lingers throughout the book, popping up here and there as she
 adopts some of its claims while persistently trying to show the
 superiority of autonomy-based weak perfectionism. Even after its initial
 overturn in this first chapter, she brings it up repeatedly, just to shut it
 down, seemingly beating a dead horse.
As she defends autonomy-valuing liberalism, she tries to fashion a
 conception of autonomy that is substantive, yet as minimal as possible,
 and with wide appeal. In the spirit of her liberal predecessor, Eamonn
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 Callan (1988), she points out that autonomy is a word used by people in
 many different ways and that philosophers cannot define it out of thin air
 to serve their purposes. Appropriately, then, she attempts to define
 autonomy without diverging too far from its commonly used sense of
 “self-rule.” While this gives her project a grounded feel and makes her
 argument comprehensible to the lay person, it goes against her intent to
 shatter uncritical intuitions which are widely held about liberalism. This
 should include scrutinizing the common use of a liberal term such as
 autonomy before adopting that use as pivotal to her seemingly more
 thorough employment, Callan’s warning notwithstanding.
Insofar as her version of liberalism is committed to the adult exercise of
 autonomy, Levinson believes liberalism must be held to the
 corresponding commitment of developing autonomy in future adults, i.e.,
 children. She rightly identifies necessary preconditions for autonomy in
 terms of first achieving personhood. Autonomy requires personality
 which enables one to be a choosing agent by virtue of having an identity
 from which to begin considering alternatives. She describes this in terms
 of “cultural coherence” in that one’s culture provides the values and
 identities necessary for one to identify one’s self. Being embedded in a
 culture also allows a person to use the normative framework of that
 culture to consider alternative lifestyles found elsewhere. An individual’s
 autonomy is also dependent on a plurality of constitutive values and
 beliefs. By aligning one’s self with some values and not others, one is
 able to have a standpoint from which to consider certain values one
 holds as well as those of other’s without putting one’s identity as a whole
 in jeopardy. They also allow an individual to introspectively consider the
 criticisms others make of him or her. Interestingly, the liberal “fact of
 plurality” becomes quietly transformed into the “good of plurality” as
 the book develops. It is a good because it contributes to the good,
 autonomy, by requiring individuals to defend their chosen conceptions of
 the good against a range of others available to them. Sufficient
 justification for its elevated status in her particular understanding of
 liberalism seems lacking and its skewing effect on the three elements of
 liberalism that she is trying to unify is overlooked. Moreover, her
 differentiation between the existence of many, often competing,
 conceptions of the good amongst peoples and the existence of a variety
 of substantive values held by an individual is problematically unclear.
To my delight, however, plurality as an autonomy-promoting good is
 linked to an autonomy-promoting community, for whose interest she
 argues that liberal freedoms and institutions must be designed to protect.
 Hence, she moves liberalism from its commonly known emphasis on
 individuals to its lesser appreciated concern for communities, along the
 way unveiling the tedious co-dependency of liberalism on a plural public
 culture for its own survival. But while plural communities provide the
 conditions for the exercise of autonomy, schools offer the best space for
 its development. And it is to this which she turns in chapter two. There,
 she provides a lengthy paragraph which lists personal qualities needed
 for developing and achieving autonomy. These range from clear self-
expression to imagination and from literacy to being culturally socialized.
 While her sense of autonomy is admittedly demanding and difficult to
 fully achieve, the characteristics she lists are admirable and capable of
 being fulfilled in a supportive context. Her sense of autonomy fits with
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 the idealistic spirit of the book and is reasoned enough to prevent
 contenders from claiming it should be more simple.
The second chapter also argues that liberal theory is compatible with state
 obligated coercion in the form of paternalism, where the coherently
 defined liberal state has the best understanding of the child’s interests,
 i.e., the development of autonomy, in mind. Coercion with the intent of
 such development is permissible because the capacity it fosters can later
 be used to overcome future coercion. Coercion by parents, however, is
 often problematically geared toward the actualization of parents’ own
 particular, content-driven, conceptions of the good improperly imposed
 on children who are not yet capable of choosing the good for themselves.
 She tackles parental rights claims to dictating the educational interests of
 children well by explaining that the child’s interest in the development of
 his or her own capacity for autonomy should be privileged over the
 muscle-flexing exercise of parental autonomy. She suitably uses the case
 of religious fundamentalist children who are raised to be heteronymous
 and to uphold one narrow view of the good life as an example of
 unjustified parental control which limits the child’s development of
 autonomy. She draws on James Dwyer briefly as she differentiates
 parents’ privileges to guide children from mistaken claims to parents’
 rights to control them. It seems that more of his work could provide
 empirical cases in which state-controlled education for autonomy must
 make significant demands in order to ensure the well-being and
 autonomy of its students. Expanding on this distinction could also bolster
 her later discussion of school choice.
Levinson contends that schools whose structure is autonomy-oriented
 through their privileging of critical reflection, reasoned argument,
 toleration, and other self-legislating endeavors are locations where, when
 immersed, children would most likely develop their own capacities. She
 suggests the opposite of most liberals’ intuitions about schooling, a
 school detached from the particular values and commitments held by
 parents or democratically chosen by the local community. In such a
 school, parental involvement would be welcomed, but parental voices
 could not shape the aims and content of the school. Levinson believes
 that this demand of liberal education would free children from parental
 tyranny which requires strict adherence to a particular conception of the
 good, bringing them into a plural community of culturally imbedded
 others where autonomy and defensible notions of the good life can be
 fostered. Although respectful of the developmental appropriateness of
 such activity, I fear she underestimates the strain children may feel when
 torn between the visions of life and education they receive from their
 state school and those upheld at home, if they have a home life stable
 enough to pass down a vision at all. Perhaps this is a negligible first
 generation effect that would be overcome once those children, schooled
 in the value of autonomy, themselves become parents. Nonetheless, the
 pain for students in the present is certainly hard to overlook. There is
 also another knotty future issue that Levinson does not sufficiently
 address. Following a few generations of schooling under her liberal
 educational ideal, many now viable ways of life would no longer be
 tenable because they would be in conflict with fully developed
 autonomy. This loss is detrimental to rich pluralism and diversity, as
 fellow liberal William Galston (1991; 2002) would most likely agree.
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 Levinson’s work is particularly interesting when read in conjunction
 with William Galston’s latest release, Liberal Pluralism (2002). The
 contradictions between the two make the demands Levinson is
 articulating clearer and shed light on their intensity. Galston argues
 against educational policy like that advocated by Levinson which places
 the coercive power of the state in the specific direction of upholding one
 specific, autonomy-driven, view of the good life. He contends that such
 an act violates the negative liberty of citizens. Galston also disagrees
 with Levinson regarding parental rights. With two key liberal
 commentators struggling over such a monumental topic, the reading of
 both is worthwhile and intriguing. Levinson would most likely contend
 that liberalism is not about maximization of choices, but about fostering
 good options which are in accord with liberal citizenship. This is a hard
 sell to make to those who see narrowly defining the good life in terms of
 autonomy as antithetical to liberalism itself. Inclusion of her thorough
 response to this matter would make her argument for implementation
 more robust.
Unlike many liberal commentators, Levinson gives more than just a
 cursory nod to the arguments of “deschoolers, functionalists, and other
 radical theorists” (p. 82) regarding the hidden curriculum that would
 most likely continue to operate in the detached school she suggests.
 Instead of shrugging off their critique, she adopts their insights, overtly
 including the hidden curriculum, though renaming it the “informal
 curriculum”. She claims that the open discussion of this aspect of
 schooling would be a valuable, knowable, and recognizable lesson in her
 ideal school. She hopes that it can be used to overcome “autonomy-
inhibiting, capitalist-driven education reform” (p. 86) when explicitly
 used to unveil these underpinnings typically functioning in schools.
She turns next to discussing civic education. Though the transition feels a
 bit awkward, the topic’s inclusion is necessary to making her portrayal
 of autonomy in a weak perfectionist state more thorough and to position
 her work amongst others who have recently considered civic education,
 though typically (as in the case of Amy Gutmann) more narrowly
 discussed in terms of democratic education. Levinson argues that
 education for autonomy and education for citizenship are not only
 compatible, but are also mutually reinforcing. Because civic education
 ensures the maintenance of a healthy liberal state which protects liberal
 freedoms and institutions, it is a prerequisite for the exercising of
 autonomy which depends on those very freedoms and institutions. There
 is also a considerable overlap of the skills and habits needed for both.
 She claims that civic education alerts students to their liberties, showing
 them how and to what extent they may act on them. She draws on the
 commonality of civic demands placed on all political actors to argue that
 the ideal liberal school should be common, with mutual language,
 common civic history, and some shared values. Schools should be a
 place where the private-public distinction of political liberalism is
 blurred (though not relinquished) through the minimally discriminatory
 incorporation of private commitments into the public identity cultivated
 in the school. She analyzes the treatment of private identities and public
 character within English, French, and American schools as she reaches
 this conclusion. She also contends that civic education offers a stable,
 ‘thick’ cultural identity which can be adopted by those students who are
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 unable to achieve embeddedness within the culture of their private home.
 It also provides the necessary shared and stable conditions for agency.
 This common identity arising from civic education can in some ways
 resolve the conflict between the development of choice and the
 development of cultural coherence which lingers in her autonomy-driven
 liberalism, though some may contend that is a homogenizing solution.
The final chapter deals with some steps and conditions necessary for the
 implementation of her ideal. One of these is granting parents and
 children a controlled choice in selecting which school to attend from a
 range of viable options. Levinson warns that choice here should not be
 understood in terms of an educational marketplace where a service is
 provided to consumers, a mistake many liberals intuitively make which
 is itself illiberal because it ranks market over political and social values.
 Rather, choice should be among student-centered, not consumer-driven
 schools. Choice should be an active process guided by free advice from
 academic professionals and not constrained by school-dictated
 admissions criteria. Levinson adds that no potential option should be a
 school which reflects a “fundamental or socially divisive” (p. 157)
 conception of the good, for fear that such a school would fail to fulfill
 the requirements of commonality or detachment. Therefore, religious
 schools, as purveyors of divisive visions of the good life, could not fulfill
 her liberal ideal. She does not, however, deny the functioning of private
 schools, but does suggest that they would require more extensive
 regulation to ensure that they meet liberal educational aims. She does a
 superb job of complicating the school choice debate through the use of
 conflicting empirical data and pinpointing theoretical differences
 between opposing positions. This discussion is timely in the United
 States given fresh evidence from test programs such as that in Cleveland
 and concerns with national assessment following President George W.
 Bush’s recent education mandates. It is also relevant to U.S. concerns
 with illiberal and intolerant teachings occurring in some fundamental
 religious schools. Although the discussion partially fulfills her aim of
 making liberal theory tenable through responding to empirical issues that
 affect it, its inclusion does not fit comfortably with the flow of the rest of
 her more theoretical argument.
One liberal education demand which may not sit well with many readers
 is that the aims of autonomy-developing liberal education should be
 constitutionally enshrined, thereby obligating the state to achieve them,
 though limiting public debate regarding them. Fixing educational aims in
 this way is a bold assertion, as I am sure Levinson is well aware. Such a
 suggestion limits the liberal ideal of public deliberation which won over
 many liberals following its expression by John Rawls a decade ago
 (1993). While she admits that debate about the elements of autonomy
 and the curriculum most successful for its achievement could continue
 following constitutional appointment, I am concerned about the publicly
 perceived futility of such debates. The populous may feel that their
 opinions are trivial in comparison to the will of a state already made
 more powerful through Levinson’s assigning it even more control.
 Throughout the book, she echoes and confirms many of the democratic
 points of the more widely read Gutmann, but, more true to liberalism,
 she argues that democratic deliberation, though important, should never
 be able to override the essential aims of education. Republican controlled
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 government and growing numbers of libertarians make talk of more state
 controlled schooling unlikely in America. Though seemingly untimely
 given its release in 1999 at the end of democratic presidential reign,
 perhaps the book is even more pertinent to liberals who feel more
 compelled now than ever to ensure that autonomy-based aims are being
 met in schools free from false-consciousness. And to this I toast
 Levinson and those encouraged to join her.
In her concluding remarks, Levinson insightfully recognizes that
 legislation regarding and constitutional inscription of the aims of liberal
 education are not enough to achieve her ideal. Political, legal, and
 cultural reforms are required. Rigorous teacher training in the
 importance and methods of developing autonomy is necessary, amongst
 other things. Most of all, an “autonomy-valuing liberal culture” (p. 165)
 is essential. To this end, she concludes by offering a challenge to citizens
 who have been swayed by her argument, to act on the very dynamic
 notion of liberalism which she has articulated. Her well-organized, clear
 arguments which require only minor understanding of philosophic
 methodology are likely to convince many already liberally persuaded
 readers, as well as some skeptics, to heed her call. Her tone carries
 conviction, which is not lost even when she admirably admits
 uncertainties or potential objections to her views, and this may convince
 even her more staunch critics to at least collaboratively join the
 discussion.
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